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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP	
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS
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APPROVAL	DISPATCH
COMMENT	FILE
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION
PREPARE REPLY	
RECOMMENDATION	
RETURN	
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Remarks: <i>FyZ</i>  <div style="text-align: right; font-size: 1.2em;"> <i>gloria,</i>  <i>pls. file in murillo part 3</i> </div>	
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DATE	
[ ] <i>Febro</i>	
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FORM NO. 2-61 237

Use previous editions

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SECRET

10 Feb. 1966

MEMO FOR: C/CI/R&A

SUBJECT: Inputting "low" level, old info.

Ref.: Recent memo from [ ]

I happened to run across an example today that John might want to keep on tap, if ever needed re SR or SG. If info came in today, or old document were found re a doorman, USSR Embassy in Washington, DC, in Feb. '54, should info be input into RIS system?

Case in point is Aleksandr Ivanovich CHERNYSHEV, who was in USA 28 Feb. '54-16 June '55, first as doorman, then as a clerk in Consular Div., USSR Embassy, WDC. He is subject of [ ]. According to [ ] he was a student of foreign languages in the USSR 1948-'50 (speaks English fluently; also studied French). According to our info (in part from AELADLE) he was English speaking member of a group of MGB officers sent c. 1951 to North Korea to work on POWs and foreign nationals in detention camps. The group, under MGB Gen. BELKIN, presumably was involved in the No. Korean detention camp recruitment of George BLAKE of British IS. Note that this activity by CHERN. occurred before he came to USA as a "doorman" (1954). By the end of Oct. 1955 he was in Geneva as Deputy Chief of the Soviet Security services for the Conference of the Heads of Governments, replacing KGB Col. Yakov SKOMOROKHIN & SMIRNOV, who had been the KGB Resident in France, 1947-'52.

No doubt there are other and maybe better examples to support indexing and inputting of "old" info re "low" level personnel.

One also wonders just what CHERN. did in USA? what contacts he had with US or British citizens? why was he sent here at that time and why did he leave before 2 year tour ended? why under doorman cover? was he under less FBI scrutiny because of "doorman" cover? Perhaps he and his career deserve even closer attention?

cc: C/CI/SIG

[ ]  
CI/OPS

CI STAFF USE ONLY

9 February 1966

RGR Comment:

I think Jean has hit the nerve. We have been going at the problem of records as if we were solely concerned with FI interests since the mid-fifties. I will be the first to concede that there was plenty of room for improvement and I think the Staff's record is clear and constructive in going more than half way in reasonable adjustments and solutions to the enumerable problems. Now, however, I feel that we must stand on principle against further cut-backs if the basic needs of the CI function are going to be satisfied. The fact is that CI finds its resources -- investigative and analytical -- without reference to the clandestinity of access. There is really no difference in the acquisition of information of a CI nature between what is covertly acquired through an operation and what is acquired through reading and analyzing overt sources. This is dramatically illustrated by the case Jean cites in the matter of defector handling. By and large, we have done badly, it has taken us too long to acquire too little from our defectors because the interrogating officers had little to contribute to developing the information.

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